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HEN we review the past year's criminal cases, we find no re-
markable departures from prior Texas and federal law as to
confessions, searches, and seizures. Harmless error analysis is
still routinely applied, and both state and federal appellate courts give
credence to trial court fact-findings unless they are clearly erroneous.
I. CONFESSIONS
A. VOLUNTARINESS
Courts determine a confession's voluntariness by considering the total-
ity of the circumstances,' including both the characteristics of the accused
and the details of the interrogation.2 They review trial court decisions as
to admissibility under an abuse of discretion standard, and will not dis-
turb them as long as the rulings are within the zone of reasonable disa-
greement. Indeed, the Texarkana Court of Appeals said that since
determination of whether a statement is voluntary turns almost entirely
on the evaluation of credibility and demeanor, the appellate court affords
* Judge, Texas Court of Criminal Appeals
1. Gachot v. Stadler, 298 F.3d 414, 418 (5th Cir. 2002).
2. Dawson v. State, 75 S.W.3d 533, 536 (Tex. App.- Texarkana 2002, no pet.).
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almost total deference to the trial judge's resolution of this issue. 3
A statement is involuntary if the record shows such official, coercive
conduct that any resulting statement is unlikely to have been a free and
unconstrained choice by its maker.4 Promises made by a police officer to
a suspect may invalidate a confession, but before they will do so, it must
be shown that the promises induced the confession. To induce a confes-
sion, a promise must be:
" positive;
" made or sanctioned by someone in authority; and
" of such an influential nature that a suspect would speak untruthfully
in response thereto. 5
Using this standard, the Houston Court of Appeals for the Fourteenth
District held that a detective's statement that "typically, juries and the
court system sometimes favor people who tell the truth," was merely a
statement of opinion, and that the defendant failed to demonstrate that
the party in authority positively and unequivocally promised leniency in
return for his confession. 6
B. CUSTODIAL INTERROGATION
The warning requirements of Miranda come into play when a suspect is
in custody. In order for a suspect to waive his or her rights under Mi-
randa v. Arizona,7 the relinquishment of the rights must be the product
of free and deliberate choice, with full awareness of the rights being aban-
doned and the consequences of doing S0.8 On the other hand, the Consti-
tution does not require that suspects know every possible consequence of
a Fifth Amendment privilege. It is sufficient that they know that they
may choose not to talk to law enforcement officers, to talk only with
counsel present, or to discontinue talking at any time.9
Once the Miranda warnings are given, if a suspect invokes his right to
remain silent, interrogation must cease.10 But a defendant's statement, "I
don't want to talk anymore. I'm tired," was held not to constitute a suffi-
ciently unambiguous invocation of his right to remain silent."t The Fort
Worth Court of Appeals likened the statement to that in Dowthitt v.
State,12 where the suspect said, "I can't say any more than that. I need to
rest."1 3 The Court of Criminal Appeals held that this merely indicated
that the defendant believed that he was physically unable to continue, not
3. Id. at 535.
4. Id. at 536.
5. Ramirez v. State, 76 S.W.3d 121, 127 (Tex. App.-Houston [14th Dist.] 2002, pet.
ref'd).
6. Id.
7. Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436 (1966).
8. Soffar v. Cockrell, 300 F.3d 588, 592 (5th Cir. 2002).
9. Ripkowski v. State, 61 S.W.3d 378 (Tex. Crim. App. 2001).
10. d.
11. Franks v. State, 90 S.W.3d 771, 787 (Tex. App.- Fort Worth 2002, pet. ref'd).
12. Dowthitt v. State, 931 S.W.2d 244 (Tex. Crim. App. 1996).
13. Franks, 90 S.W.3d at 787.
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that he wanted to quit talking.14
Courts have also held that a suspect must unequivocally invoke his or
her right to counsel for it to be effective. Therefore, when during his
interrogation a defendant asked the officer whether he should get an at-
torney, how he could get one, and how long it would take to have an
attorney appointed, such procedural statements were held to be too am-
biguous to constitute assertion of his right to counsel, and thus did not
preclude admission of the statements made afterward. 15
But once a suspect has unequivocally invoked his or her right to coun-
sel, all interrogation by the police must cease until counsel is provided or
the suspect reinitiates conversation. 16 This is a "clear, bright line, consti-
tutional mandate."'1 7 Nevertheless, where police obtained a murder de-
fendant's initial statement in disregard of his right to counsel assertion,
and the defendant initiated a second interview with no other factors indi-
cating that his second statement was involuntary, he was held to waive his
previously asserted right to counsel for purposes of the second
interview.18
As to the determination of whether a defendant has invoked the right
to counsel, the trial judge's decision will usually not be disturbed. In Ji-
minez v. State,19 the Corpus Christi Court of Appeals held that even
though the defendant's statements that he requested counsel before con-
fessing were uncontroverted, the trial judge was free to disbelieve his tes-
timony, and since appellate courts give almost total deference to the trial
judge's findings of fact, the confession was admissible.
The Houston Court of Appeals for the First District reiterated that the
Miranda warnings are not essential to the validity of a confession that has
been obtained in a foreign country by foreign officials. It also said that
the questioning by foreign police of a citizen under indictment in the
United States without the presence of his attorney does not violate the
Sixth Amendment right to counsel. 20
C. STATUTORY REQUIREMENTS
In addition to incorporating the Miranda warnings, Article 38.22 of the
Texas Code of Criminal Procedure sets out additional requirements for a
confession's admissibility. Thus, the suppression of an oral confession
was upheld where it was the result of custodial interrogation and was not
recorded as required by article 38.22, section 3.21
14. Id.
15. Gachot, 298 F.3d 414 (5th Cir. 2002).
16. Benoit v. State, 87 S.W.3d 668, 675 (Tex. App.- San Antonio 2002, pet. ref'd).
17. McCarthy v. State, 65 S.W.3d 47, 51 (Tex. Crim. App. 2001).
18. Herron v. State, 86 S.W.3d 621, 629 (Tex. Crim. App. 2002).
19. Jiminez v. State, 67 S.W.3d 493, 502-03 (Tex. App.- Corpus Christi 2002, pet.
ref'd).
20. Goldberg v. State, 95 S.W.3d 345, 382 (Tex. App.-Houston [1st] 2002, no pet.).
21. Lacy v. State, 80 S.W.3d 207, 211 (Tex. App.- Austin 2002, no pet.) (citing TEX.
CRIM. PROC. CODE ANN. art. 38.22 § 3 (Vernon 2003)).
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In another case involving an oral confession, the taped confession was
held to be voluntary and admissible, even though the answer to one of
the required warnings was inaudible. The court deduced from the entire
tape that from context, the answer to the question was affirmative. 22
Article 38.22, section 6, requires the trial judge in all cases involving a
confession's voluntariness to make findings of fact. The judge may do so
either by writing and signing them or dictating them into the record. If a
judge fails to do so, the appellate court will usually abate the appeal and
send the case back to the trial judge to comply with the statute after the
fact.23
Generally, when an adult suspect confesses in another state to a Texas
crime, Texas courts will look to see if the out-of-state officers substan-
tially complied with the required warnings.24 The Corpus Christi Court
of Appeals determined that the officers did not substantially comply with
Article 38.22's requirement that the warning that the defendant could ter-
minate the interview at any time be on the face of the written statement.
But the evidence did show that the defendant did in fact receive that
warning. Therefore, the court held that since the evidence was undis-
puted that the Miranda warnings were given to the defendant in writing,
and the additional warning that he could terminate the interview at any
time was given orally, his substantial rights were not violated, and the
statement's admission was not reversible error.25
D. JUVENILES
Like last year, we had an extraordinary number of published juvenile
cases. Texas courts continue to look very closely at juvenile confessions
and insist that they be obtained in strict adherence to the relevant Family
Code provisions. Of course, the Code's provisions generally do not apply
to juveniles' non-custodial statements.2 6 Last year, the Austin Court of
Appeals held in In re RJH that since a juvenile's first confession was im-
properly obtained, subsequent non-custodial statements made to police
officers modifying the earlier statement were also inadmissible. 27
The Supreme Court of Texas reversed that decision.28 In doing so, it
made the following statements:
If a juvenile's earlier inculpatory statement was made while in cus-
tody, but he had been warned of his constitutional rights only by a
police officer, rather than by a magistrate, rendering the earlier state-
ment inadmissible under state law, then the voluntariness of a later
22. Randle v. State, 89 S.W.3d 839, 843 (Tex. App.-Houston [1st Dist.] 2002, pet.
ref'd).
23. Gutierrez v. State, 71 S.W.3d 372, 380 (Tex. App.-Amarillo 2001, pet. ref'd).
24. Nonn v. State, 69 S.W.3d 590, 591 (Tex. App.-Corpus Christi 2001, pet. granted).
25. Id.
26. In re E.M.R., 55 S.W.3d 712, 717 (Tex. App.-Corpus Christi 2001, no pet.).
27. In re R.J.H., 28 S.W.3d 250, 254-55 (Tex. App.-Austin 2000), rev'd, 79 S.W.3d 1
(Tex. 2002).
28. In re R.J.H., 79 S.W.3d 1, 9 (Tex. 2002).
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confession, for due process purposes, is determined by the totality of
the circumstances, to determine whether the confession was the
product of official coercion.29
" The juvenile defendant's statement acknowledged that the officer
had advised him of his constitutional rights and that he chose to
make a statement "freely and voluntarily, without being induced by
any compulsion, threats, promises, or persuasion." The juvenile
signed the statement, and his father, who was present throughout the
officer's questioning, also signed it.30
* The juvenile had not been in custody at the time of an earlier oral
confession. He had initiated contact with the officer on more than
one occasion. He and his cousin had been caught with stolen prop-
erty from the burglary. His efforts to take sole responsibility for the
crime appeared to be consistently motivated by his own belief that
any punishment he might receive in the juvenile system would be less
than what his adult cousin would receive.31
The Fifth Circuit also applied the "totality of the circumstances ap-
proach" to determine if a juvenile's confession is voluntary.32 It stated
that the circumstances to be considered include:
* evaluation of the juvenile's age, experience, background, and
intelligence;
* whether he has the capacity to understand the warnings given him;
* whether he has the capacity to understand the nature of his Fifth
Amendment rights; and
* whether he has the capacity to understand the waiving of those
rights.33
In another case, Odessa police notified a suspect's mother that he had
been taken into custody as a juvenile absconder. The next morning, with-
out re-contacting the mother, they questioned him about a March, 1999
murder. Reversing the El Paso Court of Appeals, the Court of Criminal
Appeals held the confession taken from the defendant at a juvenile de-
tention facility, after he was duly warned of his rights, was properly ad-
mitted by the trial court. The court found that the police officer properly
notified the mother "of the reason for taking the child into custody," as
required by Family Code section 52.02(b). 34 He was not also statutorily
required to tell her that he suspected her son of committing a murder or
to notify her again before questioning him.35
In another case involving parental notification, the Court of Criminal
Appeals held that a police officer's failure to promptly notify a juvenile's
29. Id. at 3.
30. Id. at 8.
31. Id. at 8-9.
32. Gachot, 298 F3d at 418.
33. Id. at 418-19.
34. Hampton v. State, 86 S.W.3d 603, 610 (Tex. Crim. App. 2002) (citing TEX. FAM.




parents of his custody did not render his written statement automatically
inadmissible in a murder prosecution, since the statutory exclusionary
rule requires a causal connection between the family code violation and
the making of the statement.36
As to how parental notice can be effectively given, the Austin Court of
Appeals held that when the Sheriff called police officers at a juvenile's
custodian's residence and told them that the juvenile was in custody for
murder, and the officers, in turn, relayed the information to the custo-
dian, the statute was satisfied. 37
A juvenile was arrested in Chicago on a Texas arrest warrant for capital
murder. She gave a written confession to Chicago police officers. In re-
versing the Corpus Christi Court of Appeals, the Court of Criminal Ap-
peals held:
" Texas law, rather than Illinois law, applies to the statement's
admissibility;
" its admissibility is determined under the Family Code statute regard-
ing confessions;
" Illinois authorities complied with Texas law to the extent necessary
to carry out Texas's intended purpose;
" failure of Chicago police to have a Texas juvenile court officer decide
whether the juvenile should be further detained was not a violation
of Texas law in light of the no-bond condition of the juvenile's Texas
warrant;
* lack of some warnings in juvenile's written statement was not viola-
tion of Texas law in light of the fact that Miranda warnings were
given;
" Illinois authorities did not comply with Texas law in that they failed
to involve a magistrate in the process of obtaining the juvenile's
confession;
" the Illinois officers' unknowing violation of Texas law did not auto-
matically render the juvenile's confession inadmissible.38
After placing a juvenile in custody, failure to take him or her to a juve-
nile processing center without unreasonable delay will invalidate a subse-
quent confession.39 On the other hand, the statute's "unnecessary delay"
requirement contemplates the possibility of a "necessary delay." And
there is also the question of when a juvenile is "in custody." Therefore,
the Houston Court of Appeals for the Fourteenth District held that an
"investigative" or "temporary" detention does not constitute "custody,"
and even if it does, under some circumstances a resulting delay may be
"necessary. 40
36. Gonzales v. State, 67 S.W.3d 910, 912 (Tex. Crim. App. 2001).
37. Horton v. State, 78 S.W.3d 701, 704 (Tex. App.-Austin 2002, pet. ref'd).
38. Vega v. State, 84 S.W.3d 613, 618 (Tex. Crim. App. 2002).
39. Roquemore v. State, 60 S.W.3d 862, 867 (Tex. Crim. App. 2001).
40. Dang v. State, 99 S.W.3d 172, 183 (Tex. App.-Houston [14th Dist.] 2002, pet.
ref'd).
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Finally, as to what constitutes custody, the El Paso Court of Appeals
held that a thirteen-year-old student, who was being questioned at school
by an armed officer in a closed office regarding allegations that he had
brought a gun to school was in custody, was entitled to warnings by a
magistrate before making any statement. The statement obtained was
therefore inadmissible. The court held this despite the fact that the stu-
dent was not restrained, and the officer was attempting to secure the
safety of the other students by locating the gun.4 1
II. SEARCH AND SEIZURE
A. IN GENERAL
Texas state courts, with a few aberrations, continue to follow the
United States Supreme Court's lead in search and seizure cases. Cases
are almost always analyzed in light of the Fourth Amendment, rather
than under the Texas Constitution.
This year the courts reminded us again that the Fourth Amendment
does not forbid all searches and seizures-only unreasonable ones,42 and
that one complaining of a search must have a reasonable expectation of
privacy. 43 And as to the standard of review on motions to suppress evi-
dence, both the state and federal appellate courts give great deference to
the trial court's determination of historical facts, while reviewing ques-
tions of law de novo.44
Of course, the Fourth Amendment's protection against unreasonable
searches and seizures does not come into play unless there is a search
involving some governmental action. It does not apply to a search con-
ducted by a private individual not acting under the control or at the be-
hest of law enforcement. 45 And a subsequent police review of items
obtained by the private individual is not a search for Fourth Amendment
purposes.46
Also, the Corpus Christi Court of Appeals reminded us that the Fourth
Amendment does not protect those who voluntarily abandon property.
The test for determining whether an object has been abandoned is one of
intent, which may be inferred from words spoken, acts done, and other
objective facts. Once it has been established that the item in question
was abandoned, there is no search or seizure under the Fourth
Amendment. 47
41. In re D.A.R., 73 S.W.3d 505, 513 (Tex. App.-El Paso 2002, no pet.).
42. Parham v. State, 76 S.W.3d 60, 63 (Tex. App.-Houston [14th Dist.] 2002, pet.
ref'd).
43. United States v. Gomez, 276 F.3d 694, 696-97 (5th Cir. 2001); Granados v. State, 85
S.W.3d 217, 222-23 (Tex. Crim. App. 2002).
44. United States v. Wilson, 306 F.3d 231, 237 (5th Cir. 2002).
45. United States v. Runyan, 275 F.3d 449, 457 (5th Cir. 2001); Cobb v. State, 85
S.W.3d 258, 270-71 (Tex. Crim. App. 2002).
46. Runyan, 275 F.3d at 464.
47. Morrison v. State, 71 S.W.3d 821, 829 (Tex. App.-Corpus Christi 2002, no pet.).
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The Houston Court of Appeals for the Fourteenth District held that
where a dog sniff outside a suspect's front door alerted officers to the
presence of a controlled substance inside, that act was not a "search" for
Fourth Amendment purposes. Citing United States v. Jacobsen,48 the
court pointed out that an individual has no reasonable expectation of pri-
vacy in possessing illegal drugs, and that a governmental investigative
technique that discloses only the presence or absence of narcotics, and
does not expose non-contraband items, activity, or information that
would otherwise remain hidden from public view is constitutionally
permissible. 49
The Fifth Circuit and the Court of Criminal Appeals both said, in
Gomez 50 and Granados51 respectively, that a person has a legitimate ex-
pectation of privacy in the place searched, and thus standing to contest
the search, (1) if he or she had a subjective expectation of privacy in the
place invaded or the item being seized and (2) if that expectation of pri-
vacy is one that society would recognize as reasonable. The Court of
Criminal Appeals went on to list factors that are relevant in determining
whether a claim of privacy in a place invaded is objectively reasonable.
They include:
" whether the accused had a property or possessory interest in the
place invaded;
" whether he was legitimately in the place invaded;
" whether he had complete dominion or control and the right to ex-
clude others;
* whether before the intrusion he took normal precautions customarily
taken by those seeking privacy;
* whether he put the place to some private use; and
* whether his claim of privacy is consistent with historical notions of
privacy.52
B. ARREST, STOP, OR INQUIRY WITHOUT WARRANT
The Austin Court of Appeals pointed out that for Fourth Amendment
purposes, there are three distinct types of police-citizen interactions:
* arrests, which must be supported by probable cause;
" brief investigative stops, which must be supported by reasonable sus-
picion; and
" brief encounters between police and citizens, which require no objec-
tive justification.
48. United States v. Jacobsen, 466 U.S. 109 (1984).
49. Porter v. State, 93 S.W.3d 342, 346 (Tex. App.-Houston [14th Dist.] 2002, pet.
ref'd).
50. Gomez, 276 F.3d at 697.
51. United States v. Granados, 85 S.W.3d 217, 223 (Tex. Crim. App. 2002).
52. Id.
1438 [Vol. 56
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1. Warrantless Arrests and Searches
Without exigent circumstances, the warrantless entry, arrest, and
search of a suspect's home violates the Fourth Amendment.5 3
In State v. Steelman,54 police had received an anonymous tip that
someone in defendant father and son's residence was selling drugs. The
officers went to the house and knocked on the door, and the son an-
swered. The officers smelled the odor of burnt marijuana in the air, but
not on the son himself. When the son, after shutting the door and retriev-
ing identification from inside the house, came out a second time and tried
to close the door behind him, the officers burst through the doorway and
arrested all the occupants, including the son. The police then obtained a
search warrant, searched the premises, and found marijuana. The Court
of Criminal Appeals said that the odor of marijuana was not sufficient
corroboration for the anonymous tip to provide probable cause to enter
the house, because it gave the police no particular reason to believe that
the son possessed marijuana.55 But Texas courts have consistently held
that (1) the smell of burnt or burning marijuana constitutes probable
cause to believe that an offense is being committed, and (2) it provides
exigent circumstances. This opinion contains some regrettably broad lan-
guage, suggesting that when two or more persons are together, and an
officer smells burning marijuana wafting from them without knowing
which one is in possession, the officer is powerless to arrest either of
them. We will see how far the court will go in limiting or expanding this
language.
In State v. Peyrani,56 the Houston Fourteenth Court of Appeals upheld
the trial court's suppression of evidence seized incident to arrest when the
officers entered the suspect's fenced-in back yard without a warrant in
search of the owner of the residence, failed to knock at the front door,
failed to ask a man they encountered at the side of the house who and
where the homeowner was, and failed to ask that man's permission to go
into the back yard.
On the other hand, the Fifth Circuit held that the warrant requirement
does not apply to a public employer's search of an employee's workplace
if the search is reasonable under the circumstances. Here, there was a
search conducted of the employee's computer for child pornography by
his supervisor. His supervisor was a law enforcement officer. The court
said that while the search had obvious criminal overtones, the purpose of
the probe, at the time of the search, remained at least partly an investiga-
tion into employee misconduct violating the employer's work policy. 57
53. Kirk v. Louisiana, 536 U.S. 635 (2002); see also Wilson, 306 F.3d. at 237-38; Gipson
v. State, 82 S.W.3d 715, 720 (Tex. App.-Waco 2002, no pet.).
54. State v. Steelman, 93 S.W.3d 102 (Tex. Crim. App. 2002).
55. Id. at 108.
56. State v. Peyrani, 93 S.W.3d 384 (Tex. App.-Houston [14th Dist.] 2002, pet. ref'd).
57. United States v. Slanina, 283 F.3d 670 (5th Cir. 2002).
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2. Investigative (Terry) Stops
In United States v. Arvizu, 58 the Supreme Court explained that in an
investigatory stop falling short of a traditional arrest, the Fourth Amend-
ment is satisfied if the officer's action is supported by reasonable suspi-
cion that criminal activity may be underfoot. The likelihood of criminal
activity need not rise to the level of probable cause, and it falls considera-
bly short of satisfying a preponderance of the evidence standard. It ad-
ded that the determination that reasonable suspicion exists need not rule
out the possibility of innocent behavior. 59
To determine the reasonableness of an investigative detention under
the Fourth Amendment, an appellate court inquires (1) whether an of-
ficer's action was justified at its inception, and (2) whether it was reasona-
bly related in scope to the circumstances that justified the interference
initially. 60 A search that is reasonable at its inception may violate the
Fourth Amendment by virtue of its excessive intensity and scope. It must
be no longer than necessary to satisfy the purpose of the stop.61 But if,
during the scope of an investigatory stop, an officer develops a reasona-
ble suspicion that the suspect is involved in, or is about to be involved, in
criminal activity, an extended detention is permissible.62
The reasonableness of an investigative detention must be examined in
terms of the totality of the circumstances together with the rational infer-
ences from those facts.63 Of course, the subjective thoughts and inten-
tions of the officer making an investigatory stop are not determinative of
whether articulable facts support a reasonable suspicion that a person
might have been, is, or may soon become involved in a crime. This suspi-
cion must be based on common sense judgments and inferences about
human behavior.64
Whether a police officer's detention of a person is reasonable depends
on the content and reliability of the information possessed by the officer.
It need not be based on his or her personal observations, but may be
based on an informant's tip that bears sufficient indicia of reliability to
justify an investigative detention.65
A rather peculiar case was decided by the Houston Court of Appeals
for the Fourteenth District this year. The majority held that an officer did
not have reasonable suspicion to stop a suspect when:
" he saw the suspect's pickup truck parked across rather than within
painted parking spaces;
" in a small lot where only employees park;
58. United States v. Arvizu, 534 U.S. 266 (2002).
59. Id. at 274.
60. Herrera v. State, 80 S.W.3d 283, 287 (Tex. App.-Texarkana 2002, pet. ref'd).
61. Green v. State, 93 S.W.3d 541, 547 (Tex. App. -Texarkana 2002, pet. ref'd).
62. Id.
63. Balentine v. State, 71 S.W.3d 763, 768 (Tex. Crim. App. 2002).
64. Martinez v. State, 72 S.W.3d 76, 81 (Tex App.-Amarillo 2002, no pet.).
65. Brother v. State, 85 S.W.3d 377, 381 (Tex. App.-Fort Worth 2002, pet. filed);
Blevins v. State, 74 S.W.3d 125, 131 (Tex. App.-Fort Worth 2002, pet. ref'd).
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" behind a closed shopping center;
" at which there had been previous burglaries;
" at 2:30 a.m.;
" on a cold morning;
" and the truck left immediately when the officer pulled up to
investigate. 66
As the dissent pointed out, the majority cited a number of cases from
the 1970's to support its reasoning and seemed to ignore the United
States Supreme Court decision in United States v. Arvizu discussed above
(as well as Texas cases in accord) that disavow the "as consistent with
innocent behavior" test and the court's admonishment condemning "di-
vide and conquer" piecemeal type analysis of the totality of the circum-
stances test.67
3. Encounters
Citing Florida v. Bostick68 and State v. Velasquez,69 the Texarkana
Court of Appeals reiterated the following principles:
" Mere police questioning does not constitute a seizure;
* The proper test, in deciding whether an officer's request to search a
bus passenger's luggage was so coercive as to vitiate that consent was
not whether a reasonable person would feel free to leave, but
whether he would feel free to decline the officer's request or other-
wise terminate the encounter. 70
* The officer is not required to advise a suspect of the right to refuse
consent to a search.
The Supreme Court recently confirmed this last principle. In United
States v. Drayton,71 the Court said that the Fourth Amendment does not
require police officers to advise bus passengers that they have a right not
to cooperate and to refuse consent to search. And the Court of Criminal
Appeals has also said that the absence of warning that the defendant has
a right to refuse consent does not automatically render his consent
involuntary.72
On the other hand, citing its own opinion in Byrd v. State,73 the Waco
Court of Appeals has repeatedly said that "an officer's failure to warn the
person that he does not have to consent is an important factor in deter-
mining whether voluntary consent was given."'74 This approach is out of
step with both Texas and federal jurisprudence.
66. Klare v. State, 76 S.W.3d 68, 71 (Tex. App.-Houston [14th Dist.] 2002, pet. ref'd).
67. Id.
68. Florida v. Bostick, 501 U.S. 429 (1991).
69. State v. Velasquez, 994 S.W.2d 676 (Tex. Crim. App. 1999).
70. State v. Hernandez, 64 S.W.3d 548, 531 (Tex. App.-Texarkana 2001, no pet.).
71. United States v. Drayton, 536 U.S. 194 (2002).
72. Johnson v. State, 68 S.W.3d 644, 653 (Tex. Crim. App. 2002).
73. Byrd v. State, 835 S.W.2d 223, 226 (Tex. App.-Waco 1992, no pet.).
74. See, e.g., Lopes v. State, 85 S.W.3d 844, 848 (Tex. App.-Waco 2002, no pet.)
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C. AFFIDAVITS IN SUPPORT OF SEARCH WARRANTS
In determining whether probable cause exists for the issuance of a
search warrant, a magistrate may draw reasonable inferences from the
probable cause affidavit and must interpret the affidavit in a common
sense and realistic manner.75 To effect a valid search warrant, a magis-
trate is not required to find proof beyond a reasonable doubt or by a
preponderance of the evidence, but only a probability that the items
sought will be found at the place to be searched. 76 And a trial court re-
viewing a magistrate's determination to issue a search warrant is limited
to examining only the four corners of the affidavit to determine whether
probable cause exists.77
In making his decision, a magistrate may rely on information supplied
by a private citizen, since, unlike many police informants, they are much
less likely to produce false or untrustworthy information. And when a
named informant, in an affidavit in support of a search warrant, is a pri-
vate citizen whose only contact with the police is the result of having
witnessed a crime committed by another, credibility and reliability of the
informant is inherent. 78
Under Article 18.01 of the Code of Criminal Procedure, an affidavit in
support of a search warrant must be signed and sworn to by the affiant.
Otherwise, the subsequent search warrant is invalid. But if a law enforce-
ment officer obtains evidence in the execution of the warrant while acting
in objective good faith reliance upon it, and it was issued by a neutral
magistrate based on probable cause, the evidence is nevertheless admissi-
ble under Article 38.23(b). 79
The Fifth Circuit addressed the federal good-faith exception to the ex-
clusionary rule this year. It reiterated the principle that where probable
cause for a search warrant is based on incorrect information, but the of-
ficer's reliance on the information's truth is objectively reasonable, the
evidence obtained from the search will not be excluded. 80
The Texarkana Court of Appeals also addressed the exclusionary rule,
stating that "if a defendant establishes by a preponderance of the evi-
dence that a false statement made knowingly, intentionally, or with reck-
less disregard for the truth was included in a probable cause affidavit,"
and "it was material to establish probable cause, the false statement must
be excised from the affidavit, and if the abridged affidavit is insufficient
to establish probable cause, the warrant must be voided, and its fruits
must be excluded from evidence. ' 81 But a misstatement in an affidavit
that is merely the result of negligence or inadvertence, as opposed to
75. State v. Duncan, 72 S.W.3d 803, 805-06 (Tex. App.-Fort Worth 2002, pet. ref'd).
76. State v. Ozuna, 88 S.W.3d 307, 309 (Tex. App.-San Antonio 2002, pet. ref'd).
77. Legere v. State, 82 S.W.3d 105, 113 (Tex. App.-San Antonio 2002, pet. ref'd).
78. Morris v. State, 62 S.W.3d 817, 824 (Tex. App.-Waco 2001, no pet.).
79. Hunter v. State, 92 S.W.3d 596, 603 (Tex. App.-Waco 2002, pet. ref'd).
80. United States v. Cavazos, 288 F.3d 706, 709 (5th Cir. 2002).
81. Clement v. State, 64 S.W.3d 588, 592 (Tex. App.-Texarkana 2001, pet. ref'd).
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reckless disregard for the truth, will not render the warrant invalid.82
Nevertheless, under the "independent source exception" to the exclu-
sionary rule, evidence obtained from an illegal source is admissible if the
same evidence was also obtained from a lawful source independent of the
illegality. In order to qualify for this exception, the government must
show (1) that the police would still have sought a warrant in the absence
of the illegal search, and (2) that the warrant would still have issued.83
D. CONSENT TO SEARCH
Consent to search is one of the well-established exceptions to the con-
stitutional requirements of both probable cause and a warrant. 84 The
government must establish that the consent was freely and voluntarily
given and that the consenting individual had authority to do so. The
United States Constitution requires that validity of consent be proven by
a preponderance of the evidence, while Texas law requires clear and con-
vincing evidence. 85
The Fifth Circuit has listed six factors to consider in deciding voluntari-
ness of consent, no one of which is dispositive or controlling. They are:
(1) the voluntariness of the defendant's custodial status; (2) the presence
of coercive police procedures; (3) the extent and level of defendant's co-
operation with police; (4) defendant's awareness of his or her right to
refuse consent; (5) defendant's education and intelligence; and (6) defen-
dant's belief that incriminating evidence will be found.86
To determine whether a defendant's consent to search following a con-
stitutional violation was valid, the Fifth Circuit considers the six factors
just discussed plus the issue of whether the consent was an independent
act of free will. 87 In deciding this issue, the court considers three addi-
tional factors: (1) the temporal proximity of the illegal conduct and the
consent; (2) the presence of intervening circumstances; and (3) the pur-
pose and flagrancy of the initial misconduct.
Third party consent to a search is valid if the third party has mutual
access and control over the property searched and if it can be said that
the defendant assumed the risk that the third party would consent to the
search. This rule applies even when defendant is present and does not
consent to the search. 88
But when a person voluntarily consents to a search, the officer's au-
thority to perform the search is not absolute. It is limited to the scope of
the consent and is generally defined by its expressed object.89
82. Moss v. State, 75 S.W.3d 132, 140 (Tex. App.-San Antonio 2002, pet. ref'd).
83. United States v. Runyan, 290 F.3d 223, 235 (5th Cir. 2002).
84. Balentine, 71 S.W.3d at 772.
85. Maxwell v. State, 73 S.W.3d 278, 281 (Tex. Crim. App. 2002).
86. United States v. Solis, 299 F.3d 420, 436 (5th Cir. 2002).
87. Id.
88. Welch v. State, 93 S.W.3d 50, 57 (Tex. Crim. App. 2002).




In other decisions, courts:
" re-emphasized the validity of the "knock and announce" require-
ment 90 unless it would be dangerous, futile, or allow the destruction
of evidence; 91
" limited the applicability of the "community caretaking" exception to
warrantless searches; 92
" reminded us that routine searches at United States borders are rea-
sonable under the Fourteenth Amendment and do not require a
search warrant, probable cause or even articulable suspicion;
93
* said that a warrantless search of a suspect's apartment, supported by
reasonable suspicion and authorized by a condition of his probation,
was reasonable under the Fourteenth Amendment;94 and
" held that suspicionless drug testing of students who participate in ex-
tracurricular activities does not violate the Fourth Amendment. 95
III. CONCLUSION
This year, our review of the confession, search, and seizure decisions
reveals restatement and clarifications of well-established law, as well as a
very few unexpected developments. We see that in most areas, federal
and state courts interpret the law in these areas similarly.
90. United States v. Valdez, 302 F.3d 320, 321 (5th Cir. 2002); Price v. State, 93 S.W.3d
358, 368-69 (Tex. App.-Houston [14th Dist.] 2002, pet. filed).
91. Broussard v. State, 68 S.W.3d 197, 199 (Tex. App.-Houston [1st Dist.] 2002, pet.
ref'd).
92. Corbin v. State, 85 S.W.3d 272, 277 (Tex. Crim. App. 2002); Andrews v. State, 79
S.W.3d 649, 651 (Tex. App.- Waco 2002, pet. ref'd).
93. United States v. Smith, 273 F.3d 629, 632 (5th Cir. 2001); Pena v. State, 61 S.W.3d
745, 753 (Tex. App.-Corpus Christi 2001, no pet.).
94. United States v. Knights, 534 U.S. 112, 121 (2001).
95. Bd. of Educ. of Indep. Sch. Dist. No. 92 of Pottawatomie County v. Earls, 536 U.S.
822 (2002).
[Vol. 561444
